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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities markets today constitute a truly transnational economic order. Both 
issuers and investors routinely participate in capital markets outside their home 
jurisdictions; broker-dealers, investment managers, and other market participants 
frequently operate across geographic boundaries; and cross-border transactions 
have reached a staggering daily volume. The legal order that regulates these markets, 
however, operates predominantly at the national scale. The substantive norms 
* Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to
Brian Broughman, Gina-Gail Fletcher, Sean Griffith, Mark Janis, and Austen Parrish for comments on 
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governing securities markets are for the most part produced by individual states and 
applied by domestic institutions. Moreover, while there may be consensus regarding 
the general objectives of securities regulation (and regarding the challenges that the 
transnationalization of markets creates), significant divergence persists across 
regulatory systems regarding the content of those norms. The resulting gap between 
the global scale of the markets and the domestic scale of regulation poses significant 
challenges to regulators as well as market participants. 
This paper is about the theory and practice of transnational legal ordering.1 It 
seeks to gain insight into how transnational legal orders (TLOs) advance by 
examining one particular problem: the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative securities.2 It focuses on events following the global financial crisis, which 
exposed the deficiencies of the existing regulatory order in identifying and 
containing the risks created by trading in those securities.3 In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the cross-border systemic risk created by OTC derivatives trading was 
characterized as a problem of global dimension that necessitated a global response. 
A wide array of actors and institutions, both domestic and international, mobilized 
quickly to craft a legislative and regulatory response. Given the catastrophic nature 
of the crisis, and the general manifestation of political will to address the problem, 
one might have predicted the successful development and institutionalization of 
shared norms regulating derivatives trading.4 That move, however, has been limited. 
The paper begins by outlining the regulatory challenges resulting from the 
globalization of securities markets and describing the evolution of the international 
regulatory regime (Part II). It suggests that to the extent a transnational order has 
emerged in that area, it is characterized not by substantive norms that have settled 
across multiple national systems, but rather by conflicts norms guiding the 
allocation of regulatory authority among national systems. Part III turns to the 
actions of regulators in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It analyzes the 
1.  See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2014) (defining a transnational legal 
order as “a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that 
authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions”). 
2.  Financial derivatives are instruments whose value is derived from some underlying 
instrument, asset, or interest. They include instruments traded on securities exchanges (including 
standardized futures and options contracts), as well as instruments traded over-the-counter (including 
swaps and other privately negotiated contracts). See generally Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the 
Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 212 n. 2 (1997) (providing a brief introduction to 
derivatives). Prior to the recent reforms discussed infra, OTC transactions were not subject to the 
reporting and margin requirements applicable to exchange-based trading in derivatives. In addition, 
they were settled between the counterparties rather than through central clearinghouses, presenting the 
risk of counterparty default. See Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the Need 
for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 
482-483 (2010) (outlining these characteristics of the OTC market). 
3.  See Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: 
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 246 (2010) (exploring reasons for the failure 
of international institutions to prevent the crisis). 
4.  As Halliday and Shaffer note, financial crises are among the types of “precipitating 
conditions” that often catalyze the formation of TLOs. Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
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rulemaking process in the United States and elsewhere, considering the various 
actors and organizations involved in that process—from national regulatory 
agencies to international standard-setting bodies to multinational regulatory 
networks. This section investigates whether the financial crisis has precipitated the 
implementation of shared substantive norms within multiple legal systems. It 
concludes that it has not, and explores certain obstacles that have impeded the 
development of an effective transnational legal order in this area. The paper 
concludes with some observations about how the political economy of particular 
regulatory regimes intersects with the theory of transnational legal ordering. 
II. CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
With certain limited exceptions, the laws governing securities markets, market 
participants such as broker-dealers, and individual transactions in securities are 
enacted at the national level. Domestic regulatory systems around the world are at 
different levels of maturity; for instance, while the United States adopted a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme in the first half of the twentieth century, many 
other countries have systems that are fewer than twenty years old.5 They also reflect 
a variety of different philosophies regarding the purpose and extent of regulation.6
As a result, applicable norms on a range of issues—from the extent and type of 
disclosure that issuers must provide to anti-fraud rules to registration requirements 
for certain market participants—vary significantly from country to country. 
The markets these laws regulate have become increasingly international. The 
range of listing options available to issuers has expanded significantly, and many 
issuers choose to list their securities on exchanges outside their home jurisdiction.7
Electronic trading has made it more practical for traders to invest in foreign 
markets, facilitating capital mobility.8 The rise of multinational exchange groups is 
also noteworthy, as such groups can use common trading platforms that enable the 
trading of particular forms of cross-border securities.9 As a result of these and other 
5.  See CALLY JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 10 
(2014) (outlining the evolution of capital markets regulation and noting that many markets 
“demonstrated surprising diversity and resistance to formal regulation”). 
6.  Id. at 4. 
7.  This is due partly to the creation of additional exchanges in emerging markets, but also to 
the fact that the increased liquidity in smaller and regional markets has made more of them attractive 
to issuers. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1435, 1464-67 (2008) [hereinafter Stock Exchanges] (describing the success of various markets  in 
competing with the historically largest markets, as well as the rise of regional financial hubs). Significant 
numbers of issuers choose to list their securities on markets outside their home jurisdictions; the New 
York Stock Exchange, for instance, currently lists almost 500 non-U.S. companies. NYSE Non-U.S. 
Listed Company Directory, https://www.nyse.com/get-started/international/documents-reports. 
8.  Stock Exchanges, supra note 7, at 1460-61. 
9.  Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), for instance, is an American network of exchanges and 
clearing houses for financial and commodity markets. ICE owns and operates eleven regulated 
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange as well as futures exchanges in Canada, Europe 
and Singapore. It also owns and operates two over-the-counter markets, along with six central clearing 
houses, again including a number outside the United States. About Us, INTERCON. EXCH.,
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factors, international debt,10 equity,11 and, particularly, derivatives markets12 have 
become vast. 
The gap between the global scale of the markets and the domestic scale of 
regulation poses significant challenges to the transnational economic order. Issuers 
seeking to raise capital in more than one market confront “duplicative, inconsistent 
and conflicting requirements which lead to significant compliance burdens and 
unnecessary barriers to cross-border trading and investment.”13 The same is true of 
market participants such as investment managers and brokers who are active in 
multiple jurisdictions. Similarly, investors considering investments outside their 
home markets face difficulties in accessing financial and other disclosure that would 
permit cross-market comparison of investments, and bear increased transaction 
costs. Of course, the gap in scale also creates significant challenges for domestic 
regulators. The primary mandate of each regulator is to ensure the stability and 
soundness of domestic markets and to protect domestic investors. But as markets 
become more interconnected, and as issuers and investors participate in more 
transactions outside their own jurisdiction, regulators routinely confront territorial 
limits on their authority to reach actors and activity that affect their markets.14
https://www.intercontinentalexchange.com/about/overview (last visited Jul. 20, 2016). See also Stock 
Exchanges, supra note 7, at 1460-61 (noting the possibility of devising new forms of securities that would 
draw on global investor pools). 
10.  As of year-end 2015, there was over $20 trillion outstanding in international debt securities 
(bonds issued in a market other than that of the issuer’s residence). Statistics, Summary of debt securities 
outstanding, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, www.bis.org/statistics (last visited Jul. 20, 2016) (reporting 
the figure as $21,121 billion). 
11.  In the United States, for instance, U.S. holdings of foreign equity securities at year-end 2014 
amounted to over $6.5 trillion in market value. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
OF FOREIGN SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2014 4 (Jan. 2016), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx (reporting portfolio 
investment of U.S. residents in equity securities issued by non-U.S. entities as $6.762 trillion as of that 
date). Foreign holdings of equity securities issued by U.S. entities also exceeded $6 trillion. DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF JUNE 30, 2015 3 (May 
2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx 
(reporting foreign holdings in U.S. equity securities as $6.665 trillion as of that date). 
12.  As of the end of 2015, the total notional value of outstanding OTC derivatives contracts 
was $493 trillion. Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-December 2015, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS 2, http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1605.htm (last visited July 3, 2016). The gross credit 
exposure related to those derivatives was $2.9 trillion. Id. Importantly, the substantial majority of those 
instruments are cross-border—in other words, the counterparty is located in a different country than 
the dealer. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,976 (May 23, 2013) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (describing cross-border transactions as “the norm, not 
the exception.”). The BIS reports that less than 24% of notional credit default swaps outstanding at 
year-end 2015, for instance, were entered into with a counterparty based in the dealer’s home country. 
Statistical Release: OTC derivatives statistics, at 5. 
13.  INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO TASK FORCE ON CROSS-BORDER REGULATION 
CONSULTATION REPORT 43 (2014) [hereinafter IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT].
14.  Specific regulatory challenges include how to regulate participants active in multiple 
markets (e.g., licensing requirements for investment advisors; broker-dealer registration requirements; 
reporting requirements for swaps dealers); how to facilitate cross-border securities settlement (trading 
hours, clearance and settlement systems); and how to resolve differences in accounting and disclosure 
requirements that affect issuers active in multiple markets as well as investors seeking to invest abroad. 
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One might expect these forces to lead to greater convergence in the laws 
governing securities markets. Importantly, however, the internationalization of 
capital markets also creates the conditions for regulatory competition. States have 
an interest not only in regulating their markets, but also in attracting capital.15
Lawmakers therefore face continuing tension between the need to strengthen 
regulation in the cross-border sphere and the desire to maintain the competitiveness 
of their markets.16 As a result, the steps taken toward transnational securities 
regulation have been tentative, and divergence across regulatory regimes persists as 
a feature of the regulatory system. 
In recent decades, much has been made of the internationalization of securities 
regulation. Significant efforts have been devoted to the development of harmonized 
rules in certain areas, including financial reporting and issuer disclosure. On the 
enforcement front, bilateral and multilateral agreements among regulatory agencies 
have established a framework for cross-border cooperation. In addition, as explored 
in the extensive literature on transgovernmentalism, transnational networks have 
developed with a view to facilitating more effective regulation of the global 
markets.17 And in certain areas, standard setting by private international bodies plays 
a role in shaping market activity.18 The following section outlines these trends in the 
regulation of capital markets. 
A. Unilateral Action at the National Level 
The primary regulatory response to the internationalization of securities 
markets is the projection of domestic law beyond the borders of the regulating 
state.19 In many substantive areas, legislatures and rule makers simply widened the 
scope of local norms to reach particular actors, or particular transactions, even when 
the activity in question was centered in a foreign country. The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, for instance, introduced a number of requirements relating to corporate 
governance (including provisions relating to the constitution and function of audit 
15.  Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 47, 51-52 (1993) (pointing out that “[s]tates compete, like firms, for capital and other 
economic factors”). 
16.  For a report highlighting this tension, see COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S.
CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007). The report 
notes the need “to strike the right balance between two statutory mandates: protecting investors and 
promoting capital formation.” Id. at 11. 
17.  See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International 
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) (accounts of transgovernmental networks 
as a key development in international governance). 
18.  See infra Part II.C (discussing the role of private standard-setting bodies). 
19.  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND.
L.J. 1405, 1437-38 (2013) (identifying regulatory unilateralism as “the baseline,” and stating that 
“[r]ather than systematically looking for cooperative solutions, [states] first attempt to address new 
cross-border challenges by applying their own laws, even if the relevant activities also have connections 
to other states.”). 
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committees) that were applied even to foreign companies, as long as their securities 
were publicly listed on U.S. exchanges.20 This law simply expanded the geographic 
reach of U.S. securities law, imposing local norms on companies active within U.S. 
markets. In Europe, too, regulators applied various financial requirements to foreign 
companies whose activities affected their markets.21
Such maneuvers are often accompanied by pullbacks that exempt—either 
entirely or almost entirely—foreign activity that has minimal effect in the regulating 
country. In the United States, for example, the law requiring registration of securities 
has extraterritorial scope, applying to offers and sales of securities that occur outside 
the United States if they have a jurisdictional nexus within the country.22 Regulation 
S, however, exempts from these registration requirements offshore offerings that 
are structured to preclude U.S. investment.23 Similarly, a number of countries 
provide exemptions from registration requirements for foreign broker-dealers 
engaged in only limited activity within their borders.24
B. International Enforcement Cooperation 
Other efforts have focused directly on the challenge of enforcing domestic 
norms in the cross-border context. Beginning in the 1980s, securities regulators in 
a number of countries developed bilateral memoranda of understanding supporting 
mutual assistance and cooperation in the enforcement of national laws. Under these 
agreements, regulators undertook to assist each other in various investigation and 
enforcement functions such as evidence gathering.25 Second-generation agreements 
of this type also provided for cooperation in supervisory functions. 
Transnational networks of domestic regulators have developed to support 
these efforts. The most prominent is the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO was formed in 1983 by securities regulators from 
North and South America as an expansion of their inter-American regional 
consortium. Regulators from other continents soon joined the organization, and it 
created a permanent General Secretariat in 1986. The organization now includes 
124 ordinary members (national securities commissions or similar entities with 
authority over securities or derivatives markets), as well as 15 associate members 
(supra- or sub-national governmental regulators and international organizations 
20.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7201-7266). 
21.  Verdier, supra note 19, at 1438-39. 
22.  15 U.S.C. § 77e prohibits the use of “any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails” to sell an unregistered security. 
23.  Offshore Offers and Sales, SEC Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (April 24, 1990), 55 Fed. 
Reg. 18306 (May 2, 1990). See IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-13 (providing 
additional examples of this sort of accommodation to foreign entities or transactions). 
24.  IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 12. 
25.  See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and 
Functionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation¸4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
69, 86-87 (1994) (describing this form of agreement). 
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with an interest in securities regulation).26 Other securities-specific network 
organizations include regional bodies such as the Asia Securities Forum, the Council 
of Securities Regulators of the Americas, and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators. Securities regulators also maintain official “dialogues” with each other 
whose goals include identifying regulatory risks, strengthening cooperation, and 
enhancing technical assistance efforts.27
Overall, the general consensus is that the level of cooperation among securities 
regulators is high, and that these instruments have helped to resolve some of the 
challenges—with respect both to enforcement and to supervision of market 
participants—posed by the transnationalization of the securities markets. One of 
the greatest success stories is practice under the Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information (MMoU) developed by IOSCO in 2002. The MMoU establishes 
requirements regarding “how [members] should consult, cooperate, and exchange 
information for the purpose of regulatory enforcement regarding securities 
markets.” It now has over 100 signatories. IOSCO reports high utilization of the 
information sharing mechanism established in the MMoU, with requests increasing 
from 56 in 2003 (shortly after its adoption) to 3,203 in 2015.28
C. Standard Setting at the National and International Levels 
During the period in which investment activity was concentrated in a few 
markets, regulators in those markets were able to insist that foreign participants 
comply with their rules or lose market access.29 As a result, standard setting in the 
area of securities regulation was conducted primarily through the export of local 
norms by dominant market regulators.30 Regulators in established markets also 
regularly provided technical assistance to regulators in developing markets, with the 
aim of elevating the level of regulation.31 These programs were often conducted 
within the framework of bilateral memoranda of understanding between particular 
agencies.
26.  About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection 
=about_iosco (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
27.  Office of International Affairs, International Regulatory Policy, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
www.sec.gov/oia (last visited Jul. 20, 2016). 
28.  Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange 
of Information (MMoU), INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/about 
/?subsection=mmou (last visited Jul. 20, 2016) (showing MMoU Information Requests). 
29.  See David Bach, Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global Governance, 36 
REV. INT’L STUDIES 561, 576-77 (2010). 
30.  See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelley, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation,
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 886 (2009); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case 
of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001). 
31.  See Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical Assistance Program, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (describing the SEC’s work 
with over 100 countries). 
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As capital market activity became more dispersed, the ability of individual 
historically strong financial centers (including the United States) to insist on 
compliance with their own particular regulations was compromised.32 Increasingly, 
the work of standard setting has shifted to the transnational plane, where it is 
conducted primarily by international organizations.33 This is not to say that 
dominant market regulators do not exert significant influence over the content of 
the relevant standards34—but the process has become a more multilateral one. The 
preeminent securities organization involved in this work is IOSCO, whose mission 
statement includes the goal to be “the global standard setter for the securities 
sector.”35
In 1998, IOSCO published its “Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation.”36 This document, as revised most recently in 2010, sets forth three 
objectives of securities regulation: protecting investors; ensuring that markets are 
fair, efficient and transparent; and reducing systemic risk.37 From these objectives 
38 principles are derived.  These principles operate at a high level—for instance, 
they include the principles that the regulator should be “operationally independent 
and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers,”38 that investors should 
have access to timely and accurate disclosure from issuers,39 and that “there should 
be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems which should 
aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable 
rules…”40 While consensus on the fundamental objectives and scope of effective 
securities regulation is fairly broad, implementation remains a struggle. The fact that 
these principles were adopted by an organization whose membership includes 
securities regulators from over 100 different jurisdictions—most of them 
representing emerging markets—is itself some evidence of broad acceptance of 
these goals.41 Implementation of the relevant principles, however, varies across 
32.  See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 328 (2010) 
(noting that U.S. regulators must address “how to export [their] preferred safeguards and reforms in a 
time of declining U.S. economic and financial influence.”). 
33.  See Karmel & Kelley, supra note 30, at 886 (“In a world where there is no economic 
hegemony by any one country, it is necessary for all of the major players in the global capital markets 
to agree upon the regulation of these markets. The development of standards through soft law is 
probably the only realistic method of doing so.”). 
34.  See Verdier, supra note 19, at 1443 (noting that the “great powers. . . are in a strong position 
to shape the international standards.”). 
35.  About IOSCO, supra note 26.
36.  See JORDAN, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing the history of this document) and at 46-47 
(discussing the most recent version). 
37. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS 3 (2010), https 
://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. 
38.  Id. at 4 (Principle 2). 
39.  Id. at 8 (Principle 16). 
40.  Id. at 12 (Principle 34). 
41.  However, membership in the Technical Committee, which is responsible for developing 
the standards, is limited to a smaller group of members. 
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jurisdictions,42 and consensus on the content of individual regulatory norms is low. 
The few examples of progress toward convergence—where the relevant norms 
have penetrated domestic regulatory systems—include international accounting 
standards and prohibitions against insider trading.43
Administrative mechanisms within IOSCO seek to translate these principles 
into national law.44 For instance, IOSCO’s Assessment Committee conducts 
country reviews that provide national regulators, particularly in developing 
economies, with road maps setting out areas for improvement. In addition, the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program initiative of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank uses the Assessment Committee’s standards as benchmarks 
when monitoring the compliance of member countries, further supporting the 
penetration of the relevant norms into national legal systems.45 Nevertheless, some 
commentators have concluded that “consensus-based international standards 
coming out of IOSCO are too compromised, too ethereal to be of great use in the 
complex and technical world of capital markets regulation.”46
* *   * 
As the account above indicates, securities law—the legal regime governing 
transactions and participants in capital markets—has not been “authoritatively 
order[ed]” by substantive norms that operate across national jurisdictions47 in more 
than a very spotty sense. However, this is not to conclude that no transnational legal 
order can be identified at work in this area. The domestic legislatures and agencies 
responsible for producing securities laws work within, and are arguably confined by, 
a framework of different transnational norms: those relating to the allocation of 
jurisdictional authority within the international system. This framework imposes its 
own form of transnational order on the regulation of global capital markets—an 
order sourced in conflict of laws rules.48 It also brings its own set of normative 
42.  See Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission 
Impossible? 4 (IMF Working Paper No. 09/168, 2009) (in a study of enforcement, concluding that many 
countries have failed to implement “credible and effective” enforcement programs despite their general 
commitment to the relevant IOSCO principles). 
43.  Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 231-33 (1998) (describing progress in these areas). 
44.  See Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, The G10 Committees, and International 
Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 869 (2009) (the goal of international standard setting of this 
type is “not to adopt legally binding international standards. . ., but rather to influence domestic 
regulatory law, practices and standards.”); see also Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 13 (identifying as 
one attribute of a transnational legal order the engagement of “legal institutions within multiple nation-
states, whether in the adoption, recognition, or enforcement of the [relevant] norms.”). 
45.  See Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (2008), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf 
/IOSCOPD266.pdf. See also Alexander, supra note 44, at 877 (noting this form of benchmarking). 
46.  JORDAN, supra note 5, at 52. 
47.  See supra note 1 (defining the attributes of a “transnational legal order”). 
48.  See Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 63, 89 (2014) (“When regulators or market participants make a claim about the application 
of one or another body of law to a given party or transaction, they are already making an implicit claim 
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assumptions. First, fundamentally, securities-related activity in (or affecting) any 
given market is best regulated by national law—whose scope is defined by 
connecting factors such as the domicile of an investor or the location of a particular 
transaction.49 Second, on the whole, competition among legal regimes (in offering 
different forms of substantive regulation) is desirable, and divergence among 
national norms will therefore be tolerated. Third, cooperation and coordination 
mechanisms can be used to address whatever challenges arise as a result of 
transnational market activity and to preserve the effectiveness of domestic 
regulation in the face of those challenges. (In the following part, we will address 
ways in which the global financial crisis complicated these assumptions.) 
With respect to derivative securities in particular, this conflicts regime exists 
alongside a strong private ordering regime shaped by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). The ISDA is a trade association whose members 
include not only derivatives dealers, but also end users (such as hedge funds) and 
certain services providers (such as accounting firms).50 Over the past several 
decades, the ISDA has been active in standard-setting, filling the gap created by 
earlier legislative reforms that left many derivatives markets essentially 
unregulated.51 Its Master Agreement and related schedules52 provide standardized 
documentation for OTC derivatives transactions that has become the “market 
norm,” governing the vast majority of transactions in those securities.53 The ISDA 
also publishes supporting documents such as users’ guides and statements of best 
practices that are intended to create a shared framework for the interpretation of 
about what the scope of their national law should be. Whether they recognize it or not, they are making 
a Conflicts argument.”). 
49.  Id. at 89-90. This approach preserves the “inherent focus on domestic markets among 
regulators[,] as they generally have as their primary responsibility the regulation of their domestic 
territory and are explicitly required by national law to consider the impact of their rule-making, 
supervision and enforcement on their domestic market as a priority, rather than consider any effect 
outside their jurisdiction.” IOSCO 2014 CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 43. 
50.  ISDA describes its membership as follows: 
These members comprise of [sic] a broad range of derivatives market participants, including 
corporations, investment managers, government and supranational entities, insurance 
companies, energy and commodities firms, and international and regional banks. In addition 
to market participants, members also include key components of the derivatives market 
infrastructure, such as exchanges, intermediaries, clearing houses and repositories, as well as 
law firms, accounting firms and other service providers. 
About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited 
Jul. 20, 2016). See also John Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown’ and ‘Partial Liftoff’: Post-Crisis Dispute Resolution in 
the OTC Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1297, 1311 (2012) (providing a 
brief description of the history and membership of the association). 
 51.  GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 41 (2013). See also Sue R. Faerman et al., Understanding Interorganizational 
Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation, 12 ORG. SCI. 372 (2001) 
(providing an account of the role another trade group, the Derivatives Policy Group, played in shaping 
financial regulation pre-global crisis). 
52.  For a description of the development of these instruments, see Gabriel V. Rauterberg & 
Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, 
and the Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 20-23 (2013). 
53.  Id. at 13. 
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resulting agreements. In addition to channeling the structure of private derivatives 
transactions in this way, the standards articulated in the ISDA agreements have also 
penetrated national legal systems—for instance, more than forty countries have 
adopted netting legislation intended to secure predictable treatment for derivatives 
under insolvency laws.54 The resulting system has been described as a “highly 
successful transnational private regulatory regime.”55
III. DERIVATIVES REGULATION: A CASE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ORDERING
As many recent studies have concluded, various pathologies in the market for 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative securities contributed to the global financial 
crisis.56 In particular, many large financial institutions had entered into credit default 
swaps57 that were linked to collateralized debt obligations backed by home 
mortgages. When the U.S. housing market collapsed, the resulting defaults on those 
mortgages triggered massive payment obligations under the swaps.58 The swap 
sellers were not able to honor their commitments to counterparties; some failed, 
and others were rescued by government intervention intended to forestall the 
further spread of defaults.59 Unsurprisingly, regulators in the aftermath of the crisis 
called for comprehensive regulation of OTC derivatives.60
The following narrative examines the legislative and rulemaking processes that 
have unfolded in the area of derivatives regulation. It describes the various actors 
involved in these processes (including national agencies, international bodies, and 
network organizations) and their progress toward the development and 
implementation of particular substantive norms. The goal of this overview is not to 
54.  John Biggins & Colin Scott, Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: 
ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (2012) 
(exploring ISDA’s strategy of “seek[ing] public incorporation of private norms within national 
legislation”). See also Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 187 (2007) 
(stating that “numerous statutes and regulations rely on certain provisions that are incorporated into 
standard form OTC derivatives counterparty contracts, even though they do not explicitly reference 
ISDA.”).
55.  Biggins, supra note 50, at 1297. See also Riles, supra note 48, at 81 (stating that the norms and 
practices of the ISDA and similar organizations “are now an integral part of the transnational legal 
culture of the financial markets”). 
56.  See Biggins & Scott, supra note 54, at 321. 
57.  A swap is “a private agreement between two parties to exchange cash flows at certain times 
according to a prearranged formula.” Partnoy, supra note 2, at 219. The formula may reference different 
underlying indices, including interest rates (in the case of interest rate swaps) and currency exchange 
rates (in the case of currency swaps). A credit default swap references “the credit or creditworthiness 
of a borrower (debt issuer).” D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 2, at 483. It functions like insurance 
against the non-payment of the underlying obligation: the seller of the swap agrees that if a default event 
occurs with respect to the referenced obligation, the seller will pay the buyer. Id. at 483-84. 
58.  See D’Souza, Ellis & Fairchild, supra note 2, at 482-84 (describing this chain of events). 
59.  Id. See also Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 
GEO. L.J. 257, 265 (2011). 
60.  In a sense, the call was for re-regulation of these securities, as it was relatively recent 
legislative reform that had removed the OTC markets from regulatory oversight. See Brooksley Born, 
Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011). 
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provide a comprehensive analysis of this episode, but rather to use it as a vehicle to 
examine the characteristics of capital market regulation as a transnational legal 
order.61 Ultimately, it aims to identify the political and economic aspects of 
securities regulation that impede progress toward an effective transnational legal 
order in that area. 
A.   Progress Toward a Transnational Approach 
Early accounts following the crisis highlighted the fact that speculative trading 
in OTC derivatives had created not just systemic risk but cross-border systemic 
risk.62 As a result, the regulatory challenge was framed as a “global and international 
collective action problem.”63
Many OTC derivatives markets are global, with the same products traded 
in multiple jurisdictions and by multinational institutions. Given that these 
markets function on a cross-border basis, it is important that there is 
international cooperation and coordination to fulfil enforcement and 
supervision responsibilities [and] minimise the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage…64
The shared assumption, in other words, was that only adopting uniform rules 
across national systems could prevent regulatory arbitrage and thereby contain the 
systemic risks presented by OTC derivatives.65
The G20 emerged as the locus for developing new regulatory standards.66
Consensus at the general level—as to the fundamental goals of mitigating systemic 
risk, improving market transparency, and protecting against market abuse—was 
61.  There are many excellent and detailed accounts of the role of derivatives in the financial 
crisis and of the regulatory steps taken in its aftermath. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial 
Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2013); David McCaffrey, 
Private and Public Controls in the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, 1984-2015 (Oct. 10, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642216; Eric Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization? The 
Post-Crisis Governance of Global OTC Derivatives, in TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER 
THE CRISIS 132 (Tony Porter ed. 2014); MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51. 
62.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (providing a definition of 
systemic risk in general, and, at Part III, discussing cross-border risk); Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of 
the International Financial Architecture After the Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81, 87 (2009) 
(describing the crisis as “a perfect illustration of systemic risk at the international level—the 
contamination of other markets, sectors, or jurisdictions following defaults in a given domestic 
economy”). See also Tech. Comm., Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, INT’L ORG. OF 
SEC. COMM’NS (2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf. 
63.  MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51, at 53. 
64.  Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, FIN. STABILITY BD. 7 (2010), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf [hereinafter Implementing Market Reforms].
65.  See id. at 2 (“Given the global nature of the OTC derivatives markets, continued 
international coordination in dealing with ongoing implementation of the G20 commitments is critical. 
Work should be taken forward by the relevant standard setters and authorities to achieve international 
consistency.”).
66.  The G20 is the forum in which finance ministers from the world’s leading economies meet 
to consider matters of economic and monetary policy. See generally Brummer, Post-American Securities 
Regulation, supra note 32, at 357-58 (providing a brief description and history of the group). 
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easy to reach.67 And at a meeting held in Pittsburgh at the end of 2009, the leaders 
of the G20 agreed to three core regulatory commitments: (1) all standardized OTC 
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, 
where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the 
latest;68 (2) OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories; and 
(3) non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital 
requirements.69
 The task of coordinating efforts to implement these core commitments fell 
primarily to the Financial Stability Board (FSB).70 This organization, founded in 
1999 but whose operations expanded following the 2008 financial crisis,71 has been 
described as a “‘network of networks’ where standard setters, financial ministries, 
and central banks all interact[.]”72 The FSB articulates its composition and mission 
in the following terms: 
The FSB has a unique composition among international bodies, because it 
brings together senior policy makers from ministries of finance, central 
banks, and supervisory and regulatory authorities, for the G20 countries, 
plus four other key financial centres – Hong Kong, Singapore, Spain and 
Switzerland. In addition, it includes international bodies, including 
standard-setters and regional bodies like the European Central Bank and 
European Commission. This means it has all the main players who set 
financial stability policies across different sectors of the financial system 
are [sic] at one table. So when policies are agreed, they also have the 
authority to carry it out. 
Policies agreed by the FSB are not legally binding, nor are they intended to 
replace the normal national and regional regulatory process. Instead, the 
FSB acts as a coordinating body, to drive forward the policy agenda to 
strengthen financial stability. It operates by moral suasion and peer 
pressure, to set internationally agreed policies and minimum standards that 
its members commit to implement at national level [sic].73
67.  Elisse Walter, Address at the American Bar Association Spring Meeting, Washington D.C.: 
Regulation of Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Activities: Finding the Middle Ground (Apr. 6, 2013). 
68.  This commitment therefore ensured that standard margin requirements would be in place 
for these securities, reducing counterparty risk. 
69.  Implementing Market Reforms, supra note 64, at 8; see also Coffee, supra note 61, at 1273; Sean 
J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation,
98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (2014) (providing accounts of this meeting). 
70.  See generally Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International 
Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157 (2013) (describing the FSB and its role in derivatives reform). 
71.  JORDAN, supra note 5, at 48 (discussing the history of the FSB as successor organization to 
the Financial Stability Forum, which emerged following the Asian financial crisis). 
72.  Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, supra note 32, at 359. See also Gadinis, supra note 
70, at 163 (describing the FSB as “an umbrella organization that comprises the diverse players active in 
international financial policymaking – international institutions, regulatory networks, private 
associations, and domestic regulators” as well as representatives from the G20 governments). 
73.  What We Do, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (last visited Jul. 
20, 2016). See also Griffith, supra note 69, at 1366; Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence 
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The FSB is used both to initiate policymaking, through special committees and 
with the support of existing networks under its umbrella, and also to coordinate 
domestic implementation of transnational standards.74 Both of these functions 
came into play in the area of derivatives regulation; a working group was created to 
develop regulatory recommendations,75 after which a formal review mechanism was 
put in place to ensure the implementation of those recommendations in FSB 
member states.76
Progress on the national level toward implementing specific legislation and 
rules has been slow, and to date reflects only moderate international consensus. 
Some major markets have adopted (or are in the process of adopting) 
comprehensive regulatory schemes governing transactions in over-the-counter 
derivatives. In the European Union, for example, the Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) adopted in 2012 introduced rules governing central 
counterparties, and imposed certain clearing and reporting obligations for 
transactions in OTC derivatives.77 A number of subsequent regulations issued 
within the EMIR framework set forth implementing rules and standards.78 In 2014, 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive followed, laying out the framework 
within which member states will regulate trading venues, including those for 
derivatives.79 In the United States, similarly, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act80
introduced provisions consistent with the G20 commitments.81 The Act also 
required the promulgation of both “entity-level” regulations applicable to swaps 
dealers (for instance, capital adequacy and reporting requirements) and 
“transaction-level” regulations applicable to the transactions they conduct (for 
instance, margin requirements and requirements relating to the confirmation, 
and Limits of the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at 
239-40 (discussing the composition and objectives of the FSB). 
74.  See Gadinis, supra note 70, at 169 (describing these functions). 
75.  See Part III.B.1 infra for further discussion of this working group. 
76.  See Gadinis, supra note 70, at 174-75 (outlining the peer review-based process put in place 
by the FSB). 
77.  Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July, 2012 on 
OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1. 
78.  See, e.g., Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 of 19 December 2012 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
regard to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, the clearing obligation, the 
public register, access to a trading venue, non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques 
for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a CCP, 2013 O.J. (L 52/11); Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on capital 
requirements for central counterparties, 2013 O.J. (L 52/37). For an overview of this implementing 
legislation, see JONES DAY, THE EUROPEAN MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION AND 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET (2013), http://www.jonesday.com/files 
/upload/EMIR_and_Transparency.pdf. 
79.  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments, 173 OJ L 349 (2014). 
80.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
81.  See McCaffrey, supra note 61, at 37. 
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clearing and documentation of swaps). Pursuant to these dictates, both the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) promulgated initial rules regulating markets in OTC 
derivatives.82 For instance, the CFTC issued rules requiring mandatory clearing for 
most interest rate swaps and for many credit default swaps.83 Both Commissions 
adopted margin and collateral requirements applicable to derivatives 
clearinghouses.84 For swaps that are not cleared through a derivatives clearing 
organization (and are therefore not subject to that organization’s margin 
requirements), both Commissions established bilateral margin requirements.85
Progress has been slower in some other systems, even within the group of FSB 
member states.86 A report issued by the FSB in 2015, for instance, notes that most 
had yet to develop margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.87
Outside that group, the picture is cloudier; some countries are simply on a slower 
time schedule, but others appear disinterested in adopting comprehensive 
regulations.88 Moreover, the reforms vary in substance across jurisdictions—on 
issues such as exemptions from regulation for certain swaps dealers, specific 
reporting requirements, and the procedural aspects of margin requirements.89 One 
recent study of clearinghouses, for example, concludes that “E.U. and U.S. 
legislators, while giving effect to the internationally agreed consensus, differ on 
granular questions concerning the regulation of derivatives clearinghouses”90—
questions including matters such as margin requirements, collateral requirements, 
and investment policy requirements.91 In other words, the high-level regulatory 
commitments agreed upon at the transnational level are not settling uniformly in 
national legal systems.92
82.  For a full description of this rulemaking, see Coffee, supra note 61, at 1275-77. 
83.  17 C.F.R. § 50.4. 
84.  See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 
69, 334, 69, 334-45 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140) (CFTC requirements); 
Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 14,472, 14,479 (Mar. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (SEC requirements). 
85.  Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 
81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 23, 140). 
86.  Useful information regarding progress in different systems toward the adoption of 
derivatives regulations can be found on the website of the Financial Stability Board, where ten progress 
reports have been posted. 
87.  OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, Tenth Progress Report on Implementation, FIN. STABILITY BD.
(2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/OTC-Derivatives-10th-Progress-Report.pdf. 
88.  See Griffith, supra note 69, at 1322-23. 
89.  See Heikki Marjosola, Regulate Thy Neighbor: Competition and Conflict in the Cross-Border Regulatory 
Space for OTC Derivatives 10 (EUI Working Paper No. 2016/01, 2016), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2733138 (outlining some of these differences). 
90.  Yesha Yadav & Dermot Turing, The Extra-Territorial Regulation of Clearinghouses, 2 J. FIN.
REG. 21, 23 (2016). 
91.  Id. at 34-45 (outlining differences between the two regimes). 
92.  See Marjosola, supra note 89, at 9 (concluding that “[m]uch of the consensus that has been 
reached under the G20 umbrella has been lost in implementation, where soft principles and policy goals 
have been translated into hard rules.”). 
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More critically, cross-border transactions (which, as noted above, account for 
the vast majority of derivatives trading)93 have become more complicated as a result 
of differences in the pace and substance of national reform efforts.94 In a 2015 
report, the ISDA observed the consequence of uncertainty regarding applicable law: 
Rather than being subject to multiple, potentially inconsistent 
requirements, derivatives users are increasingly choosing to trade with 
counterparties in their own jurisdictions. The result is a fragmentation of 
liquidity pools along geographic lines, which reduces choice, increases 
costs, and will make it more challenging for end users to enter into or 
unwind large transactions, particularly in stressed markets.95
In this respect, the process has not yielded the sort of uniform and collective 
response desired. 
The following section investigates more closely some of the challenges that 
have impeded transnational reform in derivatives regulation. 
B. Obstacles to the Formation of a TLO 
1. Issue alignment 
In the United States, Dodd-Frank allocated regulatory authority over swap 
agreements to both the Securities and Exchange Commission (as to “security-based 
swaps”96) and the Commodity Futures Trade Commission (as to all other swaps).97
Consistent with the international orientation described above, it required the 
agencies not only to work in collaboration with each other, but also to consult with 
foreign regulators in establishing consistent international standards.98 However, the 
agencies worked independently in developing rules to satisfy these requirements. 
They proceeded on different time schedules and arrived at different substantive 
regulations.99 In particular, the SEC adopted a somewhat less aggressive approach 
93.  See supra note 12. 
94.  See FSB Tenth Progress Report at 13 (“[U]nevenness in the pace of implementation of reforms, 
as well as inconsistencies or gaps in the application of requirements to cross-border transactions, can 
result in duplicative or overlapping requirements or lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.” 
95.  Briefing Notes, The Dodd Frank Act: Five Years On, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N 8 
(2015), http://www2.isda.org/dodd-frank/ (last visited Jul. 20, 2016). 
96.  “Security-based swap” is defined as any agreement, contract, or transaction that is a swap 
based on a narrow-based security index, a single security or loan, or event relating to the issuer of either. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act amended the securities laws to bring security-
based swaps within the definition of “security.” Dodd-Frank Act § 761(a). The Dodd-Frank Act also 
gave the SEC anti-fraud enforcement authority over “security-based swap agreements.” Dodd-Frank 
Act § 712(d). 
97.  Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 7 U.S.C. § 1a (amending CEA section defining swaps). 
98.  Section 752(a). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS:
REGULATORS’ ANALYTICAL AND COORDINATION EFFORTS 15 (2014) (explaining that the purpose 
of this requirement was to enhance coordination in arriving at “consistent international standards 
regarding the regulation of swaps, security-based swaps, swap entities, and security-based swap 
entities”). 
99.  For an exhaustive treatment of interagency coordination issues, see id. at 35-41. 
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than the CFTC regarding the extraterritorial reach of its rules.100 Conflict internal 
to the domestic regime therefore slowed progress and (as discussed further below) 
interfered with international negotiations. 
Another alignment issue arose due to the assignment of the problem at the 
international level. Both before and immediately following the financial crisis, 
international network organizations were created that were dedicated to the issue of 
OTC derivatives regulation. They included the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group 
(ODSG), chaired by the New York Fed,101 and the OTC Derivatives Regulators’ 
Forum (ODRF), created in 2009 “to provide authorities interested in OTC 
derivatives markets and their supporting infrastructures with a means to cooperate, 
exchange views, and share information on OTC derivatives central counterparties 
(CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs).”102 However, as described above, following 
the G20’s adoption of core commitments regarding derivatives trading, the task of 
coordinating implementation fell to the FSB. This move took the issue out of the 
hands of the derivatives networks, as described by the ODRF itself: 
[S]ince its formation the environment in which the ODRF has been 
operating has changed significantly: the international standard setting 
bodies have created risk management standards for infrastructures serving 
the OTC derivatives markets; further, domestic mandatory clearing and 
reporting rules have resulted in the increased use of these infrastructures 
to meet the G20 objectives. Authorities participating in the ODRF have 
noted that several of the gaps and concerns the forum was initially formed 
to address are now more appropriately handled by these standard setting 
bodies and domestic authorities.103
As noted above, the FSB operates as a meta-network, coordinating 
participants from multiple private and public sectors. In launching its work, the FSB 
called for the formation of a working group to help develop recommendations on 
the implementation of the core commitments regarding OTC derivatives. It 
included representatives of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 
IOSCO, and the European Commission.104 In subsequent meetings, additional 
100.  See infra. The CFTC’s approach, enshrined in its proposed guidance released on June 29, 
2012, was widely criticized as overly aggressive in asserting the Commission’s authority to apply its rules 
to swap participants worldwide whose activities touched the United States. See Regulator of the World,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2013. 
101.  This group, comprising “representatives of major OTC derivatives market participants 
and their domestic and international supervisors,” was formed in 2005. The last documents posted on 
its website date to 2011. See OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html#tabs-1 (last visited 
Jul. 20, 2016). 
102.  See OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ F., http://www.otcdrf.org/index.htm (last visited 
Jul. 20, 2016). 
103.  Id. The group subsequently revised its mandate to focus on information sharing and 
cooperation. See Revised Framework for Information Sharing and Cooperation Among OTC Derivatives Regulators,
OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ F. (2014), http://www.otcdrf.org/documents/odrf
_framework_may2014.pdf. 
104.  Implementing Market Reforms, supra note 64, at iii. 
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organizations were brought into the implementation process: for instance, in a 2011 
meeting, the G20 requested the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
IOSCO, “together with other relevant organizations,” to work on developing 
standards on margin requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives.105
As this account demonstrates, the issue of regulating OTC derivative securities 
was wrapped into much broader discussions regarding financial regulation generally. 
Given the proliferation of international institutions at that point engaged in various 
financial sectors,106 many different entities had their hands on the issue of 
derivatives regulation, with the Financial Stability Board playing only a loose 
coordinating role. The transnational entities whose mandates aligned most closely 
with the specific question of derivatives regulation were not in control of the 
process.107
2. The return of unilateralism 
Because rulemaking within the G20 framework proceeded at the national level, 
it was clear from the outset that significant divergence might remain in the scope 
and content of regulation (if for no other reason, simply because the pace of 
legislative reform would differ). In light of this, both the United States and the 
European Union, while working to implement their own rules complying with the 
G20 commitments, nevertheless preserved the right to apply domestic law 
extraterritorially if they felt that doing so was necessary to protect the integrity of 
their markets.108 Each threatened to bar foreign dealers from participating in local 
swaps markets if it concluded that those dealers were not sufficiently regulated by 
their home country. For instance, Section 715 of Dodd-Frank provided that entities 
could be prohibited from participating in the U.S. swaps markets if they were 
domiciled in nations whose own regulation was deemed inadequate to protect “the 
105.  G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building Our Common Future: Renewed 
Collective Action for the Benefit of All ¶ 24 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-
cannes-declaration-111104-en.html. 
106.  See Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 73, at 239 (noting that at that point in time 
“the international institutional landscape was rapidly becoming quite cluttered.”). 
107.  This is not to say that sector-specific networks had no input—the OTC Derivatives 
Regulators Group, for instance, comprising the principals of regulatory authorities in Australia, Brazil, 
the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Ontario, Quebec, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United 
States, advise G20 leaders and the FSB on cross-border implementation issues. See OTC DERIVATIVES
REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) TO G20
LEADERS ON CROSS-BORDER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (2015),  http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups 
/public/@internationalaffairs/documents/file/odrgreportg20_111.pdf; OTC DERIVATIVES 
REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT ON AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS TO RESOLVING CROSS-BORDER
CONFLICTS, INCONSISTENCIES, GAPS AND DUPLICATIVE REQUIREMENTS (2013),  
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. However, 
the transnational process was located within the broader FSB working group. Helleiner notes another 
change in the constitution of contributors to these networks: “[T]he unprecedented politicization of 
OTC derivatives in the wake of the crisis—particularly within the USA and Europe—has drawn many 
domestic groups into the policymaking process beyond those involved in the FSB’s elite 
transgovernmental networks.” Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization?, supra note 61, at 143. 
108.  See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1263-64 (focusing on this extraterritoriality problem). 
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stability of the United States financial system.”109 The European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation adopted a similar approach: in Article 25, for instance, it 
reserved the right to bar foreign CCPs from providing clearing services within the 
European Union if they were not subject to “effective supervision and 
enforcement” in their home jurisdiction.110 In this sense, the respective countries 
used extraterritorial regulation as a backstop to efforts to harmonize regulation of 
the derivatives markets.111
The extent to which domestic laws would apply extraterritorially generated a 
significant dispute between the United States and the European Union. In mid-
2012, the CFTC issued proposed guidance on this point, which indicated an 
aggressive approach toward the extraterritorial application of U.S. regulations.112
Under this guidance, U.S. rules would have been applied to several categories of 
transactions substantially connected with foreign markets—including, for example, 
transactions between foreign affiliates of a U.S. person and foreign parties.113 The 
guidance offered limited relief only for non-U.S. registered swap dealers or major 
swap participants, who would be exempt from U.S. regulation if they complied with 
foreign regulatory requirements that the CFTC deemed comparable. The CFTC’s 
position was opposed by the European Union, which in spring 2013, along with the 
finance ministers of several other countries, complained to the U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury that it did not defer sufficiently to European rules and would lead to a 
fragmentation of the derivatives market.114
Following additional discussions, the CFTC and the EU in summer 2013 
issued a joint statement reaffirming their mutual commitment to the general 
approach of substituted compliance, stating that “[j]urisdictions and regulators 
should be able to defer to each other when it is justified by the quality of their 
respective regulation and enforcement regimes.”115 And the CFTC subsequently 
109.  15 U.S.C. § 8304 (2012). Section 722(d) further provided that U.S. law would apply to 
foreign swap activities that had “a direct and significant connection” with activities in U.S. commerce, 
or that were deemed evasive of U.S. law. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i). 
110.  EMIR Article 25. The European regulators likewise provided that EU law would apply to 
certain foreign swap activities that were deemed to have a “direct, substantial and foreseeable effect 
within the Union,” or that were deemed evasive of European regulations. Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 285/2014 of 13 February 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect of contracts within the Union and to prevent the evasion of rules and 
obligations, 2014 O.J. (L 85/1). 
111.  See Griffith, supra note 69, at 1325, 1329-30. 
112.  Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 12, 2012). See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1277-78 (describing the proposed 
guidance). 
113.  See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1278 (“the guidance would have exempted transactions only 
between a non-U.S. swap entity and a non-U.S. counterparty that was not an affiliate of a U.S. person.”). 
114.  Ministerial-level Joint Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency and nine foreign authorities on 
Cross-Border OTC Derivatives Reform to Jacob J. Lew, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 19, 2013), 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2013/20130419.html. 
115.  Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Cross-Border Regulation of 
Swaps/Derivatives, Discussions between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
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modified its position, expanding the category of transactions eligible for exemption 
on the basis of compliance with comparable foreign requirements.116 It also issued 
a no-action letter concluding that the European Union’s risk mitigation rules were 
“essentially identical” to the CFTC’s own (and thus that market participants 
complying with those rules were conclusively in compliance with U.S. regulation).117
Subsequent action by the CFTC, however, appeared again to frustrate 
expectations regarding the possible scope of extraterritorial regulation. At the end 
of 2013, the CFTC issued another advisory that approved the entity-level 
regulations of several other regimes as comparable to U.S. regulation, but approved 
only a very limited number of transaction-level regulations.118 The result was that 
many transactions would remain subject to the CFTC’s transaction-level 
requirements, which include the clearing requirement, the trade execution mandate 
and real-time public reporting obligations. 
A spokesman for European Commissioner Barnier was “surprised” by the 
CFTC advisory, stating that it “seem[s] to us to go against both the letter and spirit 
of the path forward agreement. … [The advisory is] another step away from the 
kind of inter-operable global system that we want to build.” One commentator 
described the resulting risk in the following way: 
[T]he global swaps market was splitting into two segments—a U.S. market 
governed by the CFTC’s rules and participants elsewhere trying to avoid 
the CFTC’s rules. This was harmful given the extent to which economic 
activity had to be coordinated across national borders. Regulators in other 
nations argued that the CFTC was violating norms of global regulatory 
cooperation given how aggressively it was claiming jurisdiction over 
activities in other nations on the grounds that they affected the United 
States.119
This dispute was eventually resolved, as the CFTC and European regulators 
came to terms on issues including the regulation of each other’s clearinghouses and 
certain margin requirements for uncleared swaps.120 However, it was resolved 
through bilateral negotiations between the regulators involved, and not by means 
of any mediation through the networking organizations.121 The dispute therefore 
European Union – A Path Forward, (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases 
/pr6640-13. 
116.  Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292 (Jul. 26, 2013). 
117.  Letter from Div. of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n on No-Action Relief for Registered Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants from 
Certain Requirements (Jul. 11, 2013) (Letter No. 13-45). 
118.  Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Approves 
Comparability Determinations for Six Jurisdictions for Substituted Compliance Purposes (Dec. 20, 
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6802-13. 
119.  McCaffrey, supra note 61, at 46. 
120.  See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. 
121.  See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1264 (noting that “[t]hroughout this bruising and hard-nosed 
negotiation process, the major international networking institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, the 
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had the consequence of pulling negotiation regarding substantive norms out of the 
transnational networks. 
3. Diagnostic issues and the political economy of capital markets 
As discussed above, the framing of the problems posed by OTC trading in 
derivative securities rested in part on two critical assumptions. The first was that the 
earlier deregulation of those markets had enabled an explosion in the speculative, 
socially non-beneficial use of derivatives, which in turn contributed to the financial 
crisis.122 The second was that the systemic risk posed by the OTC markets was not 
only cross-border but also truly global in nature, and thus could be contained only 
through concerted global action.123 This framing engendered expectations that the 
incentives were in place to advance the spread of transnational norms related to the 
regulation of derivatives trading.124 The regulatory process that has unfolded since 
the crisis, however, has revealed confrontations between these assumptions and the 
political economy of the global capital markets.125
On the first point, it is important to emphasize that trading in OTC derivatives 
is not per se irrational or inefficient. Indeed, the primary purpose of derivatives is 
to permit entities engaged in productive economic activity to manage the financial 
risks that those activities create.126 OTC derivatives are particularly useful in this 
regard, as they can be customized in order to address the specific hedging or other 
needs of the counterparties.127 As rulemaking proceeded, the initial and somewhat 
rough framing of the issue (that unregulated trading in OTC derivatives creates 
unacceptable levels of systemic risk) gave way to debates over exactly how the risks 
created by abusive or purely speculative OTC trading could be contained without 
eliminating the beneficial aspects of that market. These debates inevitably involved 
a clash between proponents of greater regulatory intervention and market 
participants who resisted the characterization of OTC derivatives as inherently 
Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the Financial Stability Board—remained largely on the sidelines, with 
the real bargaining being between U.S. regulators and an EU commissioner.”). 
122.  See generally Born, supra note 60. 
123.  Supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
124.  Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, supra note 32, at 331 (“[O]nly where securities 
regulation touches upon ‘systemic risks. . .’ will regulators be sufficiently incentivized to cooperate and 
will networks potentially be capable of realizing significant regulatory coordination.”). 
125.  See JORDAN, supra note 5, at 52. 
126.  MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 51, at 43. Frank Partnoy outlines the argument as follows: 
Derivatives, the argument goes, allow corporations, governments, financial firms, and others 
to: (1) reduce or hedge exposure to fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
equity and commodity prices, and other financial variables; (2) speculate in a less costly and 
more efficient manner; and (3) capture arbitrage opportunities and thus reduce funding and 
other financial costs. 
Partnoy, supra note 2, at 213. 
127.  Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 677, 735 (2002); see also Gina-Gail Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of 
Hedging with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 828 (2014). 
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dangerous.128 It was to be expected that different countries would strike the balance 
between these interests differently, depending in part on the strength of local 
lobbies on behalf of market participants.129
On the second point, the framing of the problem as a shared global concern 
ignored the political economy of individual capital markets. As discussed above, 
countries continue to maintain different regulatory philosophies, and have different 
outcome preferences, with some preferring weak regulation.130 With respect to 
derivatives regulation in particular, regulatory competition may benefit certain 
countries. As noted above, banks are free to move their derivatives operations to 
whatever country offers the most hospitable regulatory regime, therefore creating 
an incentive for some host countries to compete by adopting less restrictive 
requirements.131 If those countries do not face significant risk from an eventual 
market collapse, they would see little benefit in adopting more restrictive rules. And, 
indeed, even clearly systemic risks, such as those created by the global OTC 
derivatives markets, do not in fact affect all markets equally. The costs of a systemic 
risk crisis would fall unevenly on different countries, posing a greater risk to the 
major markets.132 Thus, it is those markets, and those alone, that have the incentive 
to invest in tightening their regulations.133 In this light, the outcome of regulatory 
efforts to date is consistent with the theory of “minilateralism”: the countries 
“whose markets are relevant (or ‘systemically important’) to the regulatory task at 
hand” are the ones that will be involved in the formation of regulatory norms.134
IV. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS IN THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES 
MARKETS
The problem of systemic risk created by OTC derivatives trading (particularly 
as considered against the backdrop of a global financial crisis) presented an 
unusually strong case for the development of a regulatory order based on formalized 
128.  At stake here was the cost of the new regulations for participants in the OTC derivatives 
markets and the concern of participants in heavily regulated markets that they would be at a competitive 
disadvantage to participants in less regulated markets. 
129.  See generally Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 450 (2008) (noting that financial firms may benefit from cross-border regulatory 
differences, and stating that their positions are likely to be “coherently articulated, actively pursued 
through lobbying, and ultimately reflected in government policy.”). 
130.  See Brummer, International Financial Law, supra note 59, at 270. 
131.  Griffith, supra note 69, at 1293. See also Helleiner, Towards Cooperative Decentralization?, supra 
note 61, at 143 (discussing the possibility that Asian countries may seek to minimize regulatory burdens 
in order to avoid undermining their own growing derivatives markets). 
132.  Swap dealers, for instance, are overwhelmingly located in the United States, the European 
Union, and a small number of additional markets. 
133.  See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1268; Brummer, International Financial Law, supra note 59, at 
270 (recognizing this problem of asymmetric benefit). 
134.  CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND 
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 85 (2014). See also Coffee, 
supra note 61, at 1268 (advocating a “minilateral” solution rather than one that aims to achieve global 
harmonization of the relevant rules). 
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transnational legal norms. The obstacles that impeded the development of such an 
order are even less likely to be surmounted in areas where the particular regulatory 
challenge is less clearly global and systemic. Indeed, a recent IOSCO consultation 
report expressed skepticism regarding the possibility of harmonization in 
international securities regulation.135 That report surveyed a number of methods 
that regulatory systems use in applying their rules to global financial activity, 
including national treatment, “passporting,” and various forms of recognition.136
The report concluded: 
From the information and analysis derived from consultation so far, no 
consensus exists on the question of whether cross-border regulation of the 
securities markets would best be achieved by full coordination and total 
harmonization of cross-border rules among jurisdictions, even if those 
goals were somehow achievable. The responses, however, make clear that 
such a result is not achievable in the current context, noting the absence of 
any supranational institution with legal authority to impose harmonized 
regulations from the top down.137
It went on to suggest a conscious turn toward a more institutionalized 
conflicts-type order—one supported by clearer rules on the allocation of 
jurisdiction among national regulators. 
Some respondents and commenters also suggested that IOSCO could 
propose a “conflict of regulations” framework, which would be used to 
determine the regulation that applies and the regulator which has 
jurisdiction in a specific cross-border situation. In their view, such a 
framework may increase efficiency and prevent duplication of supervisory 
work with regard to reporting. These responses also noted that IOSCO 
could propose a granular set of rules determining the regulation that applies 
with regard to the reporting duties and designate the regulator to which the 
concerned market participant has reporting duties.138
The most recent wave of rulemaking, which incorporates a “substituted 
compliance” (or “mutual recognition”) approach, takes steps in this direction. The 
substituted compliance approach was first developed in a 2007 article co-authored 
by the director and the general counsel of the SEC’s Office of International 
Affairs.139 In the original article, the authors applied this approach to the question 
of exchange and broker-dealer regulation. They argued that 
instead of being subject to direct SEC supervision and U.S. federal 
securities regulations and rules, foreign stock exchanges and broker-dealers 
135.  BD. OF INT’ ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, IOSCO TASK FORCE ON CROSS-BORDER 
REGULATION, CONSULTATION REPORT (2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf 
/IOSCOPD466.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Consultation Report]. 
136.  Id. at 8. 
137.  Id. at 44. 
138.  Id. at 45-46. 
139.  Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A 
New International Framework, 48 HARV. J. INT’L L. 31 (2007). 
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would apply for an exemption from SEC registration based on their 
compliance with substantively comparable foreign securities regulations 
and laws and supervision by a foreign securities regulator with oversight 
powers and a regulatory and enforcement philosophy substantively similar 
to the SEC’s.140
This model takes for granted that different countries will adopt different 
regulatory frameworks (in other words, it does not presuppose a move toward 
eventual unification of the rules governing securities markets). It provides instead 
that a country can choose to recognize another regime as substantively equivalent 
to its own. 
Recent rulemaking explicitly adopts this substituted compliance model.141 In 
early 2016, for instance, the CFTC and the European Union approved a substituted 
compliance framework for the regulation of central counterparties (CCPs).142 Under 
this framework, the European Commission agreed to issue an equivalence 
determination permitting U.S.-registered CCPs to provide clearing services within 
the European Union as long as they meet applicable U.S. requirements.143 Similarly, 
the CFTC agreed to issue a determination concluding that the requirements set 
forth in the European EMIR were comparable to U.S. requirements, and that EU-
registered CCPs complying with EMIR would be deemed in compliance with U.S. 
law. The SEC too has adopted rules incorporating a substituted compliance 
approach—for example, in connection with reporting requirements applicable to 
security-based swaps.144
This model is compatible with the conflict-of-laws framework. Each national 
regulator continues to apply its own domestic law to foreign entities whose 
operations affect its markets, and to particular transactions involving domestic 
interests. It is domestic law, in the form of an equivalence or comparability 
determination, that dictates whether compliance with a foreign regime will be 
accepted as sufficient. It may be that this approach promotes the ultimate 
harmonization of substantive rules; indeed, the regulators presented this framework 
140.  Id. at 32. 
141.  See Marjosola, supra note 89, at 12-14 (discussing the adoption of a substituted compliance 
approach in both the European Union and the United States). 
142.  Comm. Fut. L. Rep. P 33644 (C.C.H.), The United States Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and the European Commission: Common Approach for Transatlantic CCPs (February 
10, 2016). 
143.  See the provisional text of the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) on the 
equivalence of the regulatory framework of the United States of America for central counterparties that 
are authorised and supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the requirements of 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.070.01.0032.01.ENG 
&toc=OJ:L:2016:070:TOC. (Mar. 15, 2016). 
 144.      Sec. Exch. Rel. No. 34-74244 (Feb. 11, 2015), Regulation SBSR—Reporting and 
Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information. Rule 908(c) of this Regulation allows foreign 
entities to request a determination that the regulatory reporting and public dissemination requirements 
imposed by their home regulator are comparable to those of the United States. 
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as “an important step forward for global regulatory convergence.”145 But that is not 
inevitable. In a release addressing certain security-based swaps, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission noted that 
[i]n practice, however, we recognize that there will be limits to the 
availability of substituted compliance. For example, it is possible that 
substituted compliance may be permitted with regard to some 
requirements and not others with respect to a particular jurisdiction. For 
certain jurisdictions, moreover, substituted compliance may not be 
available with respect to any requirements depending on our assessment of 
the comparability of the relevant foreign requirements, as well as the 
availability of supervisory and enforcement arrangements among the 
Commission and relevant foreign financial regulatory authorities.146
As Annelise Riles has pointed out, the benefit of a more robust conflict-of-
laws based approach is that it can go beyond generalized rules to encompass 
expansive and sensitive analysis, issue by issue and party by party, of the most critical 
questions regarding the choice to exercise regulatory power: “What other regulatory 
authority is involved? How different are the rules and principles of the two possible 
authorities? Who are the parties? What is the nature of the transaction? What state 
and private interests are implicated?”147 In the context of substituted compliance, 
accordingly, the granularity of the equivalence determinations is critical.148 In this 
connection, it is important to note that some market participants and policymakers 
have resisted this form of “issue by issue” analysis, advocating instead for broad, 
categorical equivalence determinations in a number of areas.149 In a dissenting 
statement criticizing the CFTC’s decision to pursue granular equivalence 
determinations regarding certain margin requirements, for instance, Commissioner 
Giancarlo stated that “instead of recognizing and building upon … the CFTC’s own 
history of using a principles-based, holistic approach to comparability 
determinations, the Commission is adopting a set of preconditions to substituted 
compliance that is overly complex, unduly narrow and operationally impractical.” 
He went on to criticize the applicable rule for requiring an “element-by-element” 
comparison of CFTC and foreign margin requirements, and a “fact-specific inquiry 
145.  Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n and Eur. Comm’n: Common 
Approach for Transatlantic CCPs (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases 
/cftc_euapproach021016. 
146.  Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-77104, Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected With a Non-
U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity, at 33. (Feb. 10, 2016).  
147.  Riles, supra note 48, at 101. 
148.  As Riles notes, a conflicts approach “generates not blanket rules, but issue-by-issue 
determinations of scope.” Id. at 101. 
149.  The recent release adopting rules governing margin requirements for uncleared swaps 
summarized the comments of market participants to this effect. Margin Requirements for Uncleared 
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin 
Requirements, 17 C.F.R. Part 23, 2016 WL 3038148, at 34828-29. 
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of each legal and regulatory provision,” rather than simply “assessing a foreign 
authority’s margin regime as a whole.”150
* *   * 
It is a temptation in studying transnational legal orders to think of them as 
evolutionary—as moving from the primitive stages of isolationism and unilateralism 
to an end state of unification.151 They have no such clear teleology. The political 
economy of particular markets may mean it is not possible (or, indeed, desirable) to 
work toward a top-down type of TLO where the norms are generated within 
transnational networks or supranational institutions and then diffused—or where 
uniform regulatory norms are developed at all. Rather, systems that continue to 
tolerate regulatory divergence, and that rely on tools such as conflicts methodology 
to manage that divergence, may persist in certain sectors. 
150.  Id. at 34853-54. 
151.  See, e.g., Riles, supra note 48, at 69 (describing this view as “standard and almost universally 
shared”); Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the Harmonization and 
Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 590 (2010) (advocating an 
“evolutionary process” leading to the development of a harmonized, centralized regulatory order). 
